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ABSTRACT 
 
 
Assessing the Political Impacts of  
a Conditional Cash Transfer: Evidence from a Randomized Policy 
Experiment in Indonesia 
 
Julia E. Tobias (Overseas Development Institute, London, UK),  
Sudarno Sumarto (SMERU Research Institute, Jakarta, Indonesia),  
Habib Moody (The Urban Institute, Washington DC, USA) 
 
 
Several developing nations, including Indonesia, have experimented with conditional cash 
transfers (CCTs) to poor households during recent years. Since 2007, Indonesia has been 
carrying out a randomized CCT pilot program (PNPM Generasi) in 1,625 villages where funds 
are disbursed to communities rather than households, and local councils allocate the funds to 
public projects following community input.  In this paper, we explore political outcomes 
associated with the program, including electoral rewards for incumbents, and political 
participation. By comparing regions receiving the program with a control group, we estimate 
the CCT’s effects on political behavior in the 2009 elections for President and the national 
legislative assembly, and we also explore its effects on local politics. We find that the CCT 
program increases vote shares for legislative candidates from the incumbent president’s party, 
improves households’ satisfaction with district-level government administrative services, and 
decreases competition among presidential candidates as measured by the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI).  We do not find conclusive evidence to support the hypothesis that 
the program increases votes for the incumbent President, and we find no evidence that the 
program significantly increases voter turnout or affects village-level politics. 
 
 
Keywords: Conditional Cash Transfer, Political behavior, Indonesia 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
 
1.1. Overview 
 
In recent years, conditional cash transfers (CCTs) have become one of the dominant strategies 
of governments in developing countries to deliver social safety nets for the poor. These 
programs, which now exist in over thirty countries, generally aim to alleviate poverty both in 
the short- and the long-term, the former through cash transfers and the latter through 
increasing investments in human capital (Fiszbein et al. 2009). The basic model for CCTs 
comes from Mexico’s Progresa program, which provides grants to households conditional on 
meeting certain health and education requirements. Several countries in Latin America and 
elsewhere have recently been developing their own variants of such programs.  From 2007 to 
2009, the Government of Indonesia launched a pilot conditional cash transfer program called 
PNPM Generasi, the National Program for Community Empowerment, which is now being 
scaled up nationally.   
 
PNPM Generasi provides block grants, equivalent to roughly 10,000 USD, to sub-districts to be 
spent on health and education projects. The World Bank assisted the government in randomly 
assigning 300 sub-districts to control and treatment groups in order to facilitate an extensive 
impact evaluation of the pilot. The evaluation, currently in progress, measures primarily 
PNPM Generasi’s achievement of its main goals: improving health and education outcomes 
(Jonishi, Olken, and Wong, 2010).  In this paper, we test the hypothesis that the program may 
have also affected several political outcomes, including electoral support for incumbents and 
the political participation. 
 
PNPM Generasi builds upon other CCT models by adding an innovative feature of targeting 
funds to communities rather than to individual households. Indonesia is the first country to 
test this type of innovation, which combines the traditional CCT model with a community-
driven development approach, where community forums are involved in allocating funds to 
village-level development priorities. This participatory approach recognizes that CCTs to 
households are not effective in areas where supply-side constraints hinder the provision of 
health and education services. For example, requirements that children must be enrolled in 
school or that pregnant women must visit health professionals for pre-natal care in order to 
receive the cash transfer cannot be enforced where there are insufficient school or hospital 
facilities.  In such settings, block grants that allow communities to decide how to use the funds 
in the best way may be more effective than channeling funds directly to households (World 
Bank, 2008).  In addition to the potential social and economic benefits of this approach, we 
hypothesize that it may also have the attractive features of being politically desirable and 
generating rewards for incumbents, while also building up political participation by 
encouraging community empowerment. 
 
Existing research on the effectiveness of both community-driven development programs and 
CCT programs generally tends to focus on human development outcomes, with little attention 
given to the potential political effects of such programs. While several evaluations suggest that 
such community-driven development programs are beneficial to their recipients, as measured 
by key social and economic indicators (e.g. Bjorkman & Svensson 2007; Fearon et al. 2009; 
Stiglitz 2002), their consequences for democratic behavior, such as participation in national 
election  are not yet well understood. Similarly, despite a growing number of studies on the 
economic impact of household CCTs (Handa & Davis 2006; Skoufias & Parker 2001), we are 
aware of only a few recent studies on their political effects, with the evidence being largely 
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limited to the Latin American cases of Mexico and Brazil (De La O 2010; Magaloni, Diaz-
Cayeros, & Estevez in press; Zucco 2010). From a policy perspective, the political impacts of 
these programs are particularly important given the potential implications for their long-term 
sustainability. 
 
Three hundred sub-districts in five Indonesian provinces were randomly assigned either to an 
untreated control group or to a group receiving the PNPM Generasi program that begun in 
June 2007. Over the next two years, treated sub-districts received annual grants of roughly 
10,000 USD to be allocated by local councils to health- and education-related projects, with 
the assistance of trained facilitators.1  The overall treatment group included two randomized 
variants of the program (See Figure 1): 1) half of the treated sub-districts were assigned to an 
“incentivized” version of the treatment, where in addition to receiving a fixed amount of 
funds, villages were eligible to receive an additional 20% in bonus funds during the second 
year of PNPM Generasi, contingent upon first-year performance on a set of health and 
education benchmarks; 2) the other half of the treated sub-districts received a “non-
incentivized” version, where funds in the second year did not depend on first-year 
performance.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Assignment Procedure 
 
  
                                                 
1The precise size of block grant sub-districts were eligible to receive was pre-determined based on the population 
and the poverty level of the sub-district. 
5 Provinces
Richest 20% of 
Districts 
Poorest 80% of 
Districts 
KDP Eligible 
Districts
Non-KDP Eligible 
Districts 
20 Districts 
Randomly Selected 
300 Remaining Sub-
districts  
Sub-districts Previously 
Treated With UPP 
Sub-districts Less 
Than 30% Rural 
100 Sub-districts 
Randomly Assigned to 
Incentivized Treatment
100 Sub-districts 
Randomly Assigned to 
Control 
100 Sub-districts 
Randomly Assigned to 
Non-Incentivized 
Treatment 
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Our research tests the main hypothesis that the CCT program has positive effects on 
incumbent re-election and on political participation. We explore these outcomes using new 
locally disaggregated data on Indonesia’s April 2009 election for the national legislative 
assembly (Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat - DPR) and the July 2009 Presidential election, and unique 
detailed data on political behavior in the village-level and district-level.  We supplement our 
key outcome measures – incumbent vote shares and voter participation – with several 
additional measures that aim to capture potential effects of the CCT on the local government 
capacity, political activeness, and the entry of women, minorities, and younger candidates into 
village-level political offices. We expect the CCT to impact the national-level elections 
(Presidential and legislative elections), since the CCT is a central government initiative, but we 
also explore the possibility that beneficiaries may credit the lower levels of government for the 
benefits associated with the program, or that the CCT may affect participation in local politics.  
 
We expect these outcomes for several reasons. The first rationale is aligned with the more 
traditional household conditional cash transfer approach of Mexico, Brazil, and several other 
nations: social transfers promise better lives for the poor, and thus a healthier relationship 
with government. If voting serves as a lever to punish or reward incumbents, then winning the 
lottery in a randomized policy experiment that provides program benefits should cause voters 
to turn out in support of their current government (Hastings et al. 2007).  The second 
rationale relates to the unique community-driven approach of the CCT, which engages 
communities in discussion forums and voting on project proposals to determine the allocation 
of funds.  Olken (2010) finds that direct participation in the decision-making process of a 
community development program in Indonesia significantly increases perceived legitimacy and 
satisfaction with this program.  We take this logic a step further and expect that communities’ 
experience with democratic decision-making processes at the local level in a context specific to 
the program may translate into greater participation in politics in general.   
 
We do not have a strong prior hypothesis on whether to expect any difference between the 
incentivized versus non-incentivized treatments, but since this additional layer of 
randomization was built into the program design , we take advantage of the opportunity to 
explore the arising differences in political outcomes across these groups.  We expect that the 
incentivized treatment may have stronger effects on voter participation and support for the 
incumbent, since this program variant is more effective in engaging community members and 
achieving program outcomes.  The reverse scenario is also possible, however; since the 
incentivized program shifts the locus of control over program outcomes toward the 
community, it may shift credit for the program away from political leaders. 
 
To preview our results, we find that the CCT program increases vote shares for legislative 
candidates from the incumbent president’s party, improves the households’ assessments of 
district-level government administrative services, and decreases the competition among 
presidential candidates, as measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI).  We find no 
conclusive evidence that the program significantly increases votes for the incumbent 
President, increases voter turnout, or affects village-level politics. 
 
It is important to note that we regard the examined political outcomes as potential side effects 
of the PNPM Generasi program, since these outcomes were never explicitly articulated as 
program goals;,the focus of the program was mainly on improving health and education 
development outcomes.  Our findings are thus not intended to be interpreted as evidence of 
the success or failure of the program.  Instead, we explore the political effects of CCTs with a 
view that, whether intentional or not, these effects may potentially have strong relevance to 
the future sustainability of such programs in the context of democratic developing countries. 
The SMERU Research Institute 
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Finally, it should be noted that the government also piloted a different CCT program during 
the same time period, known as Program Keluarga Harapan (PKH), the Hopeful Family Program, 
with funds targeted directly to households rather than communities.We will not analyze this 
program at this point, however, due to data constraints and because PKH was subject to some 
non-random selection.  Additionally, a direct comparison of the effects of PNPM Generasi’s 
community CCT approach and PKH’s household CCT approach is difficult due to different 
initial sampling procedures of both programs. We plan to analyze the PKH program separately 
in the future, subject to data availability. For now, we note that there is no overlap between 
the treatment and control groups assigned to PKH and PNPM Generasi, so potential spillover 
effects between areas receiving the different programs should not be a concern. 
 
 
1.2. Review of Literature 
 
A large body of existing research provides evidence that in developing countries, social 
programs are often governed by traditional-style clientelistic politics, where politicians target 
private benefits toward certain individuals in exchange for votes and the benefits may be 
withdrawn if voters do not fulfill their commitments.2  The recent types of CCTs differ from 
such clientelistic programs, however, in that funds are allocated according to rules-based 
formulas that minimize the discretion over the process.  Generally, the selection of regions for 
CCT programs is based on geographic targeting procedures that favor poorer regions, and the 
disbursement of funds to households or communities within selected regions is conditional on 
the achievement of the program’s health and education requirements rather than on the 
interest of politicians. While the design of CCT programs and their levels of independence 
from politics may vary across countries, CCTs generally tend to be much harder for politicians 
to manipulate than traditional transfer programs, and the benefits can not be easily targeted 
toward or withdrawn from particular households or communities.  Understanding the extent 
to which CCT programs are associated with electoral rewards or other political effects can 
give an insight into the long-term political will of a government to implement CCTs as 
alternatives to traditional social transfers. 
 
Research on the political effects of CCTs has emerged only recently, and most of the existing 
empirical work is limited to non-randomized analyses that focus exclusively on Latin 
American countries.  Magaloni et al. (in press) use matching techniques to calculate electoral 
returns of Mexico’s Progresa, for example, and find the program generates electoral gains for 
the incumbent party and its candidates, although these gains are not as great as those induced 
through previous clientelistic vote-buying strategies and discretional transfers.  Similarly, 
Zucco (2010) provides evidence, using observational data, that Brazil’s CCT, the Bolsa Familia, 
provided electoral returns to the incumbent President Lula da Silva in the 2006 election.  
These authors’ methods assume that participation in the program can be considered as an 
exogenous variable due to the inclusion of covariates, which, however, is a strong and 
potentially questionable assumption.  In another recent study, Manacorda, Miguel, and 
Vigorito (2010) examine Uruguay’s CCT using a regression discontinuity approach, and 
provide evidence that Uruguay’s PANES program increased the support for the current 
government relative to the previous administration by 11-14 percentage points. However, the 
regression discontinuity method they use faces the potential problem that the sample of data 
                                                 
2For example, Stokes (2005) provides evidence of the politics of patronage in Argentina’s Trabajar public 
employment scheme; Magaloni et al. (in press) provide evidence of clientelist politics in Mexico’s PRONASOL 
program, the precedessor to Progresa.   
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clustered around the discontinuity threshold may be limited, while the expanded interval 
around the threshold carries the risk of making the estimates biased. Further, similar to the 
approach of Magaloni et al. and due to the unavailability of official electoral data, Manacorda 
et al. infer voting behavior from exit poll data, though such data may be inaccurate. 
 
The only randomized evaluation of the political effects of a CCT program of which we are 
aware is De La O (2010), which finds that the Progresa randomized conditional cash transfer 
program boosted the turnout in Mexico’s 2000 elections by seven percent and increased the 
incumbent’s vote share by sixteen percent. Our study builds upon these findings by testing the 
hypothesis that CCTs may provide electoral advantages to incumbents and increase political 
participation in the context of Indonesia, a developing country outside Latin America. We also 
examine the political outcomes of CCTs at two levels: the national one and the local one. This 
is in contrast to all of the studies described above, which focused exclusively on the central 
level. We are able analyze a detailed set of political measures, going beyond incumbent vote 
shares and voter participation, as our data contains official electoral results and household 
survey responses. 
 
Our hypothesis is consistent with theories of retrospective voting, where politicians are 
rewarded for providing desirable goods or services to their constituents (Key 1961), and 
politicians’ past performance is viewed as a predictor of future performance (Fiorina 1981).  
Even if politicians cannot directly punish CCT beneficiaries who do not vote for them, it may 
be rational for CCT beneficiaries to vote for incumbents as a response to receiving the 
program.  For example, in an environment where voters lack perfect information on the 
incumbent’s performance and the quality of their economic policy, receipt of the conditional 
cash transfer can plausibly be interpreted as evidence of a political commitment to continuing 
such programs or to catering to the poor in general. The logic of our hypothesis fits with 
Ansolabehere, Rodden and Snyder (2006)’s findings economic issues are central to voters in 
comparison with moral or ideological concerns.  Reciprocity may also play a role in helping to 
explain why CCT recipients might be likely to vote for a government that has initiated such a 
program (Cox et al. 2007; Gneezy & List 2006; Regan 1971), regardless of whether future 
benefits are contingent upon supporting the political incumbents. This type of behavior 
differs from vote-buying or clientelism (Stokes 2005) in that it does not necessarily pose a 
threat to democracy; in fact, a certain level of electoral responsiveness to conditional cash 
transfers may be necessary to sustain the political will for such programs.   
 
Indonesia is an excellent setting to test our hypotheses, as no other nation has introduced 
participatory development programs on such a large scale. The introduction of a randomized 
CCT facilitates our empirical analysis and allows us to measure the causal effects of the 
program while alleviating potential concerns about the endogeneity bias.  Much of the existing 
research that attempts to infer how social transfer programs affect voting behavior by 
comparing recipients voting patterns with non-recipients faces the challenge that funds are 
often targeted based on socio-economic criteria, which tend to predict political behavior, or 
are targeted based on political characteristics. For example, if politicians tend to direct 
transfers toward their core supporters, any relationship detected between receipt of the 
transfer and higher support for incumbents may be spurious. The randomization of the 
PNPM Generasi program provides a source of exogenous variation that allows us to compute 
unbiased estimates of changes in voting behavior that can be attributed to receiving the 
program, rather than to pre-existing differences between recipients and non-recipients.   
 
Additionally, the community-based development model embedded in the PNPM Generasi 
program, where funds are distributed to communities at the sub-district level rather than to 
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individual households, implies that the CCT might enhance political participation.  Greater 
local participation in decision-making through the program might increase voter turnout 
through empowering poor citizens;.  engagement with one’s community in problem-solving 
and decision-making may reinforce the trust, commitment, and group identity of stakeholders, 
feeding political energies that find later expression in voting (Ostrom 1998). Recent findings 
lend support to the significance of personal contact and social pressure in shaping political 
behavior. For example, in get-out-the-vote field experiments, doorstep canvassing is more 
effective than direct mail and scripted telephone appeals by several percentage points (Gerber 
& Green 2000). Our paper is not able to distinguish between different potential causal 
mechanisms that may be responsible for the political effects we observe, but we hope that this 
discussion of plausible causal mechanisms suggests useful avenues for future research. 
 
 
 
II. ORIGINS OF PNPM GENERASI: INDONESIAN SOCIAL 
PROTECTION SINCE 1998 
 
 
The development of a modern system of social protection in Indonesia began in response to 
the Asian economic crisis of 1997. As panicked investors withdrew funds from overheated 
markets, the value of the Indonesian rupiah declined by 85 percent and the poverty rate 
increased from 15 percent to 33 percent in one year. Mass deprivation provoked rioting in 
major cities, leading to the downfall, in May, 1998 of the thirty-three-year Suharto 
dictatorship. With support from several international donors, including the World Bank, the 
new government immediately introduced a social safety net (“Jaring Pengaman Social” – JPS) to 
mitigate the effects of the crisis on Indonesia’s poorest citizens. These programs included the 
Operasi Pasar Khusus (OPK) – rice and basic commodity subsidy programs, the padat karya 
employment creation programs, health sector (bidang kesehatan) programs, and a scholarship 
program. 
 
The government also moved swiftly to reduce regressive but politically entrenched fuel 
subsidies, a holdover from the Suharto era, and redirected the savings toward more equitable 
social protection initiatives. The subsidies were first slashed by 12 percent in October 2000, 
and further reduced, following rising government spending on fuel, as crude oil prices surged 
in 2005 and 2008. Both the 2005 and 2008 reductions were accompanied by a cash transfer 
program (Bantuan Langsung Tunai – BLT, introduced in 2005 in Indonesia for the first time), 
which delivered unconditional quarterly tranches of cash to cushion the adverse effects of 
price shocks on the poor. The initiative reached 19 million statistically identified poor 
households and lasted between October 2005 to October 2006 and June 2008 to December 
2008. Recent evidence suggests that the program brought some substantial welfare gains to 
the households reached, although both the targeting and coverage of BLT were flawed (World 
Bank 2006).   
 
At the same time, after years of Suharto’s authoritarianism and a legacy of endemic 
corruption, Indonesian officials also sought to use community-driven development to 
decentralize the provision of public goods. In 1998, the government began issuing pilot grants 
to rural sub-districts (kecamatan) to spend on infrastructure projects, most commonly roads, 
under the auspices of a new national program, the Kecamatan Development Program (KDP). 
Grants of roughly 8,000 USD were disbursed to villages within sub-districts via an inter-village 
forum. The process was competitive: proposals were ranked in a voting process, and once a 
proposal was chosen, an implementation team was elected. Urban communities were eligible 
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to participate in a similar program, the Urban Poverty Project (UPP), where grants of up to 
50,000 USD funded training, community organizations, infrastructure development and 
microcredit. Over several phases in the early 2000s, these initiatives grew to comprise the 
largest participatory development program in the world, expanding from a handful of sites to 
over half of Indonesia’s villages by 2007. 
 
Starting in 2006, Indonesia revamped its schemes of transfers to households and communities 
(for a full timeline, see Figure 2). Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono declared 
the unconditional cash transfer program a success, but stated that further transfers would be 
restructured to more effectively promote development objectives. To replace the BLT, the 
Indonesian government, with the World Bank’s assistance, announced the Hopeful Family 
Program (Program Keluarga Harapan - PKH), wherein payments to households would be 
disbursed conditional on achieving a series of health- and education-related benchmarks. Cash 
transfers to communities were restructured under the new umbrella of the National Program 
for Community Empowerment (Program National Pemberdayaan Masyarakat – PNPM), which 
now administers three initiatives; the KDP and UPP programs have been enhanced and 
renamed as PNPM-Urban and PNPM-Rural (PNPM Mandiri), while the third initiative, PNPM 
Generasi, provides block grants to communities for health and education projects rather than 
infrastructure, conditional on commitments to improve the same set of health and education 
outcomes as in PKH.  This paper focuses on PNPM Generasi. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Timeline of Events 
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PNPM Generasi and Keluarga 
Harapan Project (PKH) transfers to 
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PNPM Generasi baseline survey 
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National legislative elections 
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Presidential elections 
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program: $2.4 billion 
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Further unconditional cash transfers: 
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PNPM Generasi’s first cycle begins 
with village planning in 129 sub-
districts December 2007 
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time, however, the public in some cases may have perceived social safety net programs 
including PNPM as programs of the President and his party rather than as programs of the 
state. The Jakarta Post noted during the campaign, for example: “Even though the party denied 
the programs were designed specifically to lure voters toward their campaign, the programs 
have generated significant positive hype during the reign of the SBY government” (Jakarta 
Post, Mar. 28, 2009).  In some cases, the President made widely publicized visits during his 
campaign tours to hand over funds from the central government to local governments. 
During the distribution of PNPM funds in the Lampung province, for example, the Jakarta 
Post quoted one villager as saying, “I hope that [Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono] will be elected 
again to President. Villagers here admire him so much because he has helped them [through 
the aid schemes]” (Jakarta Post, Mar. 28, 2009).  When public opinion polls showed spikes in 
approval ratings for the President and his PD party in October-November 2008, the rise in 
popularity was widely attributed in the press to a recent advertising campaign promoting and 
raising public awareness about these programs.  The ads, which were funded by the state as 
program-related expenses, were criticized as being essentially political ads (Jakarta Post, Nov. 
20, 2008).  This paper is the first to empirically test these types of anecdotal speculations about 
a possible link between the PNPM program and political outcomes.  
 
For pregnant mothers: 
1. Four pre-natal care visits 
2. Receipt of iron tablets during pregnancy 
3. Delivery assisted by a midwife or doctor 
4. Two post-natal care visits 
 
For children under five 
1. Complete childhood immunizations 
2. Ensuring monthly weight increases for infants 
3. Monthly weighing for children under three and bi-annually for children under five 
4. Vitamin A twice a year for under-fives 
 
For school-aged children 
1. Primary school enrollment of all children 7 to 12 years old 
2. Minimum attendance rate of 85% for all primary school-aged children 
3. Junior secondary school enrollment of all 13 to 15 years old 
Figure 4. List of CCT Program Benchmarks/Conditionalities 
 
 
 
III. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
 
 
Five Indonesian provinces were selected to receive PNPM Generasi: East Java, West Java, 
Gorontalo, North Sulawesi, and East Nusa Tenggara. In Indonesia, a province (propinsi) 
comprises many districts (kabupaten), a district comprises many sub-districts (kecamatan), a sub-
district comprises many villages (desa/kelurahan), and a village comprises many sub-villages 
(RT/RW/dusun). Within selected provinces, treatments were assigned according to the 
following process. First, districts were ranked according to their wealth on the basis of 
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poverty, school transition, and malnourishment rates, and the richest twenty percent of 
districts were excluded.3 Then, among districts already receiving KDP,4 twenty districts were 
randomly selected for PNPM Generasi and stratified by province. In Gorontalo and North 
Sulawesi, the set of districts was small enough that every eligible district was selected.  Within 
the selected districts, all sub-districts previously treated with the Urban Poverty Program 
(UPP) or where less than 30 percent of the villages and urban precincts are classified as rural 
by the Indonesian Statistics Bureau (BPS) were eliminated.  
 
A control group and two treatment groups were randomly drawn from the remaining set of 
300 sub-districts, stratified by district. Both treatments were identical, except that in the 
“incentivized” treatment, villages were eligible to receive bonus funds of up to 20 percent of a 
village’s fixed baseline allotment during the second year of PNPM Generasi, contingent upon 
first year performance; in the “non-incentivized treatment,” second-year funding did not 
depend on first-year performance. Groups were evenly split (n = 100). Overall program 
compliance rates were high: only 22 of the 200 sub-districts that were supposed to receive 
either variant of the program did not receive the program at all between 2007-2009.  Delays to 
the program start-up date did occur in some cases, however, as can be expected with 
development programs in the field: 129 of the sub-districts assigned to treatment were treated 
in the first cycle, beginning in 2007, while 49 were treated in the second cycle, starting in 
2008.5  Figure 1 displays, by province, the assignment of sub-districts to experimental groups. 
 
 
 
IV. RELEVANT BACKGROUND ON ELECTORAL POLITICS 
IN INDONESIA 
 
 
This section provides background information on Indonesian politics, useful for 
understanding the political outcomes analyzed in this paper.  The goal is to provide a quick 
snapshot of Indonesia’s political landscape, with emphasis on electoral politics at the national 
and sub-national levels. 
 
Elections for seats in the national legislative assembly (DPR), also referred to as the People’s 
Representative Council or House of Representatives, are held every five years, immediately 
before the presidential elections, and party support garnered in the legislative elections 
determines which parties can field candidates in the Presidential election.  Indonesia’s most 
recent DPR elections were held in April 2009, with over 30 parties fielding candidates.  The 
most votes were won by the Partai Demokrat (20.85%), Golkar (14.45%), and Partai Demokrasi 
Indonesia Perjuangan, PDI-P (14.03%).   
 
The Indonesian President serves a five-year term with a two-term maximum. The most recent 
Presidential election, held in July 2009, was contested by three candidates:  
1)  Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (commonly referred to by his initials, SBY), the incumbent 
President, who previously served as a high-ranking military commander and then as 
Minister of Mines and Energy before helping to establish the PD party;   
                                                 
3Data on district-level socio-economic variables came from Indonesia’s National Socio-economic Survey 
(SUSENAS).  
4The purpose of this requirement was to ensure some prior experience with local infrastructure programs. 
5Reasons for the program delays were typically related to funding issues at the level of the central government. 
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2)  Megawati Sukarnoputri, a former President (2001-2004) and leader of the PDI-P party 
who had been an opposition candidate in the 2004 presidential elections.  She is also the 
daughter of Indonesia’s first president, Sukarno, who presided over Indonesia’s transition 
to independence from Dutch colonial rule in 1945;  
 3)  Jusuf Kalla, a former businessman and Chairman of the Golkar Party, who served as 
SBY’s Vice President during his first term in office (2004-2009).   
 
President SBY won a landslide victory in the election, capturing 60.8% of the vote in the 
election, exceeding the minimum constitutional threshold required to be declared the winner 
without the necessity of a run-off between the top two candidates, as had been required 
between SBY and Megawati in the 2004 elections.  Megawati and Kalla won 26.8% and 12.4% 
of votes, respectively.  SBY is the first  the fourth President to be elected directly in Indonesia 
since democracy was introduced in 1998 after the fall of Suharto, whose authoritarian rule 
over the country lasted for over three decades (1967-1998).   
 
Regarding local politics, Indonesia has begun decentralizing its democracy over the past 
decade.  Elections called Pilkada for province heads (gubernor) and district heads 
(bupati/walikota), which positions were appointed during the Suharto era, were phased in, 
starting in 2005, with staggered timing across the country.  Elections for district heads and 
province heads are scheduled to occur every five years. Below the district level, sub-district 
heads (camat) are appointed, and rural village heads (kepala desa) are elected according to 
staggered schedules every 5-8 years, while urban village heads (kepala lurah) are appointed by 
district-level officials.  District heads usually have political party affiliations, while village heads 
are banned from joining political parties.  Villages are also required by law to form elected 
legislative bodies, Badan Perwakilan Desa (BPD), which serve the functions of assisting with the 
village governance and checking the power of the village head, though so far the 
implementation of this law has been somewhat uneven across regions. 
 
 
 
V. DATA  
 
 
5.1. Description of Data  
 
Our primary source of data is the World Bank Indonesia’s Health and Education Services 
Survey, a longitudinal panel that includes a baseline survey conducted in June - August 2007 
before the start of PNPM Generasi, and an endline survey conducted in October - December 
2009 on the full set of randomized treatment and control sub-districts.  The survey data 
include in-person survey interviews with household respondents and village leaders.6  Eight 
villages were randomly selected from each sub-district and one sub-village was randomly 
chosen from each village.  From each sub-village, five household respondents were selected, 
stratified to include higher representation of the program target groups (e.g. households with 
women of child-bearing age or school-aged children).7 8  Additionally, one respondent per 
                                                 
6World Bank CCT Baseline Survey Report (2007) provide more details on the survey sampling procedure.   
7Specifically, households in each sub-district were categorized into 3 groups: i) households with 
pregnant/lactating mothers or married women pregnant during the last 2 years; ii) households with children 6-15 
years of age; iii) other households. The 5 respondents per sub-district were then chosen as follows: 2 from group 
i, 2 from group ii, and 1 from group iii (CCT Baseline Survey Report, p. 11). 
8In later drafts of this paper, we plan to use sample weights equal to the inverse of a respondent’s sampling 
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village (the village head if available, or otherwise an alternate village leader such as the village 
secretary) completed the village leader survey and provided data on official voting records.  In 
total, there were over 10,000 household survey respondents and roughly 2,000 village leader 
respondents in 20 districts (300 sub-districts).  We aggregate all of the data to the sub-district 
level (the unit of randomization). Each sub-district is coded by its assigned treatment status 
and its actual treatment status, including the year of PNPM Generasi’s introduction and 
whether the sub-district received the incentivized or non-incentivized treatment.   
 
Since Indonesian electoral data disaggregated below the district level are generally not publicly 
available, this survey’s data provide a unique insight into several political variables of interest 
to this research. The survey includes several questions on political outcomes, which we 
roughly divide into the following five categories: 1) support for incumbents and political 
competition; 2) voter participation; 3) political access and local government capacity; 4) 
satisfaction with public services; and 5) entry into the village head office.  Wherever possible, 
we explore the potential political impacts of PNPM GENERASI at multiple tiers of 
government, including the central, district-level, and village-level politics. We are grateful to 
the World Bank for the opportunity to assist in developing these sections of the survey. 
 
5.1.1. Support for Incumbents and Political Competition 
 
The first section on support for incumbents and political competition explores data collected 
from village leaders’ official records on votes for each candidate in the April 2009 legislative 
election and July 2009 presidential election, disaggregated to the village level, and in the most 
recent village head election.9  We construct several indicators using these data, including the 
share of votes for the incumbent president, the share of votes for legislative candidates from 
the President’s PD party, and the incumbent village head’s vote share.  The data on legislative 
candidates includes the vote share percentages only for the top three candidates from each 
village; we use these data to create two variables: the combined vote share of all PD candidates 
(out of the total votes recorded), and a dummy variable for whether the first-place candidate is 
from the PD party (“PD_WINNER”). We also construct two standard indicators to measure 
overall levels of competition in the presidential election and the village head elections: 1) the 
Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI), equal to the sum of squared vote shares of all candidates, 
where 0=perfect competition and 1=no competition; and 2) the winning margin of victory, 
equal to the difference in vote shares between the top two candidates, where closer differences 
imply stronger competition.  We are unable to analyze voting in district head elections, since 
only few districts in the sample had elections scheduled during the 2007-2009 time period of 
the CCT pilot.  The survey also includes information on the total number of political parties 
that visited the villages in the past year.  We assume that such visits, which coincided with the 
campaign period for the legislative and presidential elections, were usually instances where 
party members gave speeches or held political rallies for the campaign.  We regard this as a 
proxy for the level of political attention given to the villages by national political parties, or 
essentially, the political importance of villages, as perceived by higher-level politicians.10  Note 
that at each level of politics, we explore the extent to which the CCT brings electoral rewards 
to incumbents as well as its effects on political competition within the system as a whole.11   
                                                 
probability (borrowed from forthcoming World Bank computations) so that our results are better representative 
of the general population.   
9Note that we have verified in a small sample of villages that the election data provided by village heads is 
identical or nearly identical to the official records held at the local election commission (KPU) office. 
10Note that village heads are prohibited from having political party affiliations. 
11Also, note that since Indonesian law requires village heads to be democratically elected only in rural villages 
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5.1.2. Voter Participation 
 
Second, we explore voter participation outcomes using data from both the village leaders and 
household surveys to test whether PNPM Generasi affects political participation. As noted 
earlier, the village survey provides information on total votes cast in the presidential, 
legislative, and most recent village head elections, which can be used to infer voter 
participation at the village level.  Because data on the total number of registered/eligible voters 
is not available, we use the village adult population (from the village head survey) in the 
denominator of these participation measures, following the approach of De La O (2010).  As 
an additional measure to cross-check the data reported by village leaders, the household 
survey asks respondents whether they participated in the most recent 1) presidential election; 
2) legislative election; and 3) village head election (in areas where a village head election 
occurred during the past two years).   It was considered to be too sensitive to ask households 
to report which candidate they voted for in these elections so the latter type of household-
level data only measures turnout rather than vote shares.  For all voter participation data, we 
report the overall participation rates as well as participation rates disaggregated by gender. 
 
5.1.3. Political Access/Activity and Local Government Capacity 
 
The third section examines several variables that are proxies of local government capacity, 
political access, and levels of political activity. We expect that PNPM Generasi may strengthen 
local government institutions and give communities a stronger political voice through 
community meetings, discussions, leadership selection procedures, budget planning, voting 
and consensus-building on project decisions, etc. From the village leader survey, we use 
information on the total number of protests to the district government during the past year as 
measure of political activeness. We also investigate the number of times that village officials 
invited or visited higher-level government offices for meetings (and vice versa), as a measure 
of the village’s access to higher-level government resources. Specifically, we focus on meetings 
with the members of the national legislative assembly (DPR), provincial and district-level 
assemblies (DPR-D), and district heads (bupati).  As a proxy for local government capacity, we 
analyze data on village-level governance boards (BPD), which are not yet functional 
everywhere, although their existence is mandated by law. The data include whether or not the 
BPD exists and the total number of the board meetings held during the past three months. As 
a final measure of local government activity at the village level, we ask the respondents to 
report whether they currently participate in any village-level government institutions/groups. 
 
5.1.4. Satisfaction with Public Services 
 
To measure the changes in satisfaction with government services, we use several questions 
asked in the household survey.  The first question asks households to evaluate any change in 
the quality of administrative services provided by the district government during the past two 
years using a 3-point scale (1=worsened; 2=same; 3=improved), while the second asks 
households to report their level of satisfaction with district government services provided in 
the same time period on a 4-point scale.  The same questions are also asked about village-level 
government services. Examples of common services typically provided at these levels of 
government include the issuance of various permits, licenses, and government identification 
cards. The PNPM program did not specifically intend to improve these types of services, so 
                                                 
(urban village heads are appointed), urban villages are dropped from the sample for the questions relevant to 
village head elections.  For this subset of questions, we also examine only villages with elections occurring the 
start of the PNPM program and the endline survey collection.  
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we are cautious in interpreting these indicators, but we expect that they may reflect the general 
levels of satisfaction with village-level and district-level government performance that PNPM 
might affect. 
 
5.1.5. Entry into the Village Head Office 
 
We also explore the extent to which PNPM Generasi may empower certain groups to be more 
policically active, given that the program involves community members in numerous 
participatory decision-making processes and might foster conditions for new leadership to 
emerge.  Using data on demographic characteristics of village heads elected after the start of 
the program, we focus on the entry of groups who have not traditionally held positions of 
power in village politics, including women (who represent less than 7% of village heads in the 
baseline survey). Several components of PNPM Generasi specifically target women due to their 
important role in helping to achieve the program’s education and maternal/child health goals; 
the program also required the formation of women’s groups, which were to submit project 
proposals to reflect the concerns of women in the communities. Additionally, we look at 
whether the program leads to the election of better-educated village leaders, using a 7-point 
categorical scale that records the highest level of educational attainment (1=no 
schooling/incomplete primary schooling; 7=post-graduate degree).  We also look at whether 
PNPM Generasi encourages the election of younger candidates as village heads, which might 
suggest a move away from traditional leadership by village elders.  Finally, we examine 
whether the program empowers candidates from poorer or smaller sub-villages, which might 
indicate a shift to a more inclusive democracy. The logic here is that wealthier candidates and 
those from larger sub-villages tend to be at an advantage where the elections are determined 
through vote-buying or voting is based solely on shared sub-village identity. Since only very 
limited socio-economic data are available at the sub-village level, we create an approximation 
of sub-village socio-economic status by asking village heads to rank each of the sub-villages 
from richest to poorest, and we standardize these rankings on a scale from 0-1. We create a 
proxy for the size of the sub-village using a dummy variable (0=largest sub-village; 1=other 
sub-village). 
 
 
5.2. Test of Balance across Treatment and Control Groups 
 
In addition to the five categories of dependent variables discussed above, we include a 
standard set of control variables in all of our regression equations that were specified in 
advance of the analysis. The variables, which come from the baseline survey, are as follows: 
the percent of the population that is Muslim, the percent of agricultural households, average 
distance (kilometers) to the district capital, urban/rural status, log of monthly per capita 
consumption expenditures (thousands of IDR), and the average education level of the 
household head. Since there is little existing literature on the determinants of political 
outcomes in Indonesia, we select these variables based on controls commonly used to predict 
voters’ behavior in other countries, and we make adjustments to the Indonesian context based 
on available data.  Several of these controls, including the log of per capita consumption, the 
percent of agricultural households and the household head’s education level, are proxies for 
socio-economic status, which is likely to be correlated with voting behavior. The distance to 
the district capital and urban/rural status variables control for geographic factors, which also 
are likely to be correlated with voting. Finally, the variable on the percentage of the population 
that is Muslim may be relevant, since several of the major political parties in Indonesia have 
Islamic affiliations.   
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We add additional controls in a few of the regression specifications as follows. Where the 
2009 SBY vote share is the dependent variable, we control for his 2004 vote share, and 
likewise, where voter participation in the 2009 presidential election is the dependent variable, 
we control for 2004 voter participation.  Data on votes cast in the 2004 official presidential 
election are borrowed from Hyde (2010); to estimate voter turnout, we combine these data 
with village adult population data from the most proximate (2005) BPS Podes village poverty 
census as a proxy for the number of eligible voters.  In the analyses of political participation, 
political activeness and the local government capacity, we include, as additional control 
variables, two indicators of general levels of community participation from the baseline 
household survey: the the average number of community groups to which households belong 
and the average total number of times households have participated in community group 
meetings during the last three months.   
 
Table 1. Test of Balance across Randomized Treatment Groups 
Means Differences - No Fixed Effects Differences - Fixed Effects 
Control 
Variables Control Incentives 
No 
Incentives 
Incentives - 
Control 
No 
Incentives 
- Control 
Incentives   
-   No 
Incentives 
Incentives 
- Control 
No 
Incentives - 
Control 
Incentives   
-   No 
Incentives 
Percent_ 
Muslim 78.329 76.634 77.466 -1.6949 -0.8634 0.8315 -1.7748 -0.3964 1.3784 
-39.18 -41.18 -40.06 -6.09 -6.09 -6.05 -1.61 -1.48 -1.4 
Percent_ 
Agricultural 79.134 74.065 78.75 -5.0696* -0.3841 4.6855* -4.6109 -0.49 4.121 
-20.01 -19.43 -18.08 -3 -2.94 -2.79 -2.96 -2.99 -2.55 
Distance_ 
To_District 33.065 35.481 38.379 2.416 5.3141 2.8981 1.4713 3.8981 2.4268 
-26 -25.33 -31.92 -3.9 -4.46 -4.31 -3.38 -3.54 -3.32 
Urban 0.037 0.032 0.011 -0.0043 -0.0252 -0.0209 -0.0031 -0.0235 -0.0204 
-0.19 -0.18 -0.11 -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 
Log_ 
Consumption 12.373 12.358 12.437 -0.0148 0.0638 0.0786 -0.03 0.0697 0.0996 
-0.54 -0.6 -0.55 -0.09 -0.08 -0.09 -0.08 -0.08 -0.08 
Education_ 
Household_ 
Head 
2.159 2.452 2.33 0.2931 0.171 -0.1221 0.2474 0.1601 -0.0873 
-1.39 -1.07 -0.94 -0.19 -0.18 -0.15 -0.19 -0.18 -0.14 
Sby_ 
Voteshare_ 
2004 
0.483 0.484 0.483 0.0013 -0.0001 -0.0014 0.0057 -0.0012 -0.0069 
-0.13 -0.14 -0.15 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
Voter_ 
Participation_ 
2004 
0.533 0.532 0.549 -0.0011 0.0167 0.0178 -0.0025 0.0184* 0.0210** 
-0.07 -0.07 -0.09 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
Community_ 
Groups 2.085 2.108 1.909 0.0222 -0.1763 -0.1984 0.0733 -0.1697 -0.243 
-2.13 -1.8 -1.54 -0.3 -0.29 -0.25 -0.26 -0.26 -0.24 
Community_ 
Meetings 11.829 10.054 9.614 -1.7755 -2.2156 -0.4401 -1.8701 -2.4225 -0.5524 
-20.29 -11.75 -14.55 -2.55 -2.73 -1.98 -2.49 -2.68 -1.98 
Joint test       0.7741 0.716 0.5109 0.6568 0.6691 0.28 
Note: Each observation is a sub-district. Standard deviations are shown in parentheses in the first 3 columns; robust 
standard errors are shown in parenthesis in the subsequent columns.  "DISTANCE_TO_DISTRICT" is the distance to the 
district capital in kilometers. "URBAN" is a dummy variable (0=rural; 1=urban) corresponding to a classification system of 
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the Indonesian Central Bureau of Statistics.  "LOG_CONSUMPTION" is the log of monthly per capita household 
consumption expenditures in thousands of IDR.  Houshold head education levels ("EDUCATION_HOUSEHOLD_HEAD") 
are coded on a 7-point scale. "COMMUNITY GROUPS" is the number of groups to which all household members belong, 
and "COMMUNITY MEETINGS" is the total number of meetings attended for these groups is over the past 3-month period. 
 
Table 1 shows that the control variables are well-balanced across the treatment and control 
groups, as we would expect given the randomization process. The first column lists the mean 
and standard deviation of each variable, while the second and third columns show the results 
of OLS regressions of the incentivized treatment and non-incentivized treatment variables 
respectively on each of the control variables.  The data are aggregated to the sub-district level 
and results are shown with and without the stratum-level fixed effects. For example, the vote 
share for President SBY is 48.3% in the control group, 48.4% in the incentivized treatment 
group, and 48.3% in the non-incentivized group, but the differences are not statistically 
significant. In total, of the 60 differences presented, one is significant at the .05 level and three 
are significant at the .10 level, which is no more than would be expected due to pure chance.  
Note also that the p-value of the joint test of significance for all of the control variables is not 
significant in any of the models (with or without fixed effects). 
 
 
5.3. Summary Statistics across Treatment and Control Groups 
 
Table 2 presents the baseline summary statistics on the treatment and control groups for the 
main dependent variables. The data shown is from the endline survey and variables relevant to 
elections at the levels of presidential, legislative, district head, and village head offices are 
displayed. Each observation represents one of the sub-districts in the experiment. On average, 
across the treatment and control sub-districts, President SBY won 53.4% of the vote share 
with a victory margin of 17%, while his PD party won 28.3% of legislative votes. Incumbent 
village heads captured 50.9% of the vote on average, with mean margins of victory of 7.2%. 
The HHI competition measure is close to 50% in both presidential and village head elections.  
Voter participation rates are similar across all elections, around 65%, except for village head 
elections, which have lower participation (54.4%).   
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Table 2. Summary Statistics of Main Dependent Variables 
  obs mean std min max 
Presidential Elections 
SBY_VOTESHARE 263 0.534 0.10 0.22 0.80 
SBY_MARGIN 263 0.170 0.20 -0.52 0.66 
HHI 263 0.491 0.06 0.36 0.69 
WINNER_MARGIN 263 0.311 0.12 0.04 0.66 
NUMBER_OF_CANDIDATES 262 2.848 0.82 1.12 5.10 
LOG_PARTY_VISITS 236 0.910 0.56 0.00 2.94 
PARTICIPATION 264 0.643 0.08 0.46 0.82 
Legislative Elections 
PD_VOTESHARE 264 0.283 0.16 0.00 0.70 
PARTICIPATION 264 0.646 0.07 0.45 0.82 
District Head Elections 
PARTICIPATION 263 0.646 0.08 0.41 0.83 
Village Head Elections 
INCUMBENT_VOTESHARE 238 0.509 0.19 0.06 1.00 
INCUMBENT_MARGIN 231 0.072 0.24 -0.65 0.76 
HHI 262 0.531 0.14 0.27 1.00 
WINNER_MARGIN 261 0.256 0.11 0.02 0.58 
PARTICIPATION 262 0.544 0.07 0.36 0.73 
Note: Each observation represents a sub-district assigned to one of the PNPM Generasi experimental groups. Data are 
from the World Bank Indonesia's Health and Education Services Endline Survey. The presidential and legislative election 
variables refer to the July and April 2009 elections, respectively.   
 
 
 
VI. RESULTS 
 
 
6.1. Empirical Strategy 
 
Our analyses measure the effects of the PNPM Generasi program on various political outcomes 
using the following ordinary least-squares (OLS) regression structure: 
 
Yijk=α + β(Treatmentijk) + γj + ζk*Mandiri + εijk, 
 
where i represents a sub-district, j represents the district-level stratum, and k represents the 
province-level.  The “treatment” variable indicates whether the sub-district was in the control 
group or received one of the treatments. The “Mandiri” x province-level fixed effect term 
corrects for the presence of the PNPM Mandiri program, where “Mandiri” is a dummy variable 
indicating areas scheduled to receive the PNPM Mandiri program before the randomization of 
PNPM Generasi took place.12  We disaggregate the treatment group in order to test for 
                                                 
12Sub-districts were allowed to participate in only one community development program during the pilot period, 
so areas randomized into the PNPM Generasi lottery were not eligible to receive PNPM Mandiri. 
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differential impacts of the randomized “incentivized” treatment variant, where some sub-
villages were eligible to receive an additional bonus of 20% of funds contingent on their 
performance in achieving the program’s specified health and education goals, compared to the 
“non-incentivized” treatment group.  We also test for differential effects of the program in the 
group that had been receiving the program for two years by the time of the endline survey 
(“start in 2007”) versus groups that had been receiving it only for one year (“start in 2008”).  
While the political effects of the program might be stronger in areas receiving the program for 
a longer period of time, an alternative hypothesis is that the program might carry greater 
political salience and benefit incumbents more in areas where the program has been 
established just recently.  
 
Table 3.  Effects of CCT on Presidential and National Legislative Election Results 
and Political Competition (by incentivized / non-incentivized treatment type) 
 
Presidential Elections National Legislative Elections (DPR) 
 
SBY_ 
VOTESHARE 
SBY_ 
MARGIN HHI 
LOG_ 
PARTY_
VISITS 
PD_ 
VOTESHARE 
PD_ 
WINNER 
INCENTIVIZED TREATMENT -0.015 -0.031 -0.004 0.152* 0.013 0.018 
(0.013) (0.025) (0.008) (0.090) (0.018) (0.034) 
NON-INCENTIVIZED TREATMENT -0.012 -0.027 0.001 0.082 0.010 -0.011 
(0.013) (0.025) (0.008) (0.087) (0.018) (0.033) 
SBY_VOTESHARE_2004 0.430*** 0.885*** 0.178*** -0.711 0.419*** 0.832*** 
(0.068) (0.132) (0.041) (0.477) (0.094) (0.174) 
PERCENT_MUSLIM -0.002 -0.003 -0.000 -0.010 0.000 0.000 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.008) (0.002) (0.003) 
PERCENT_AGRICULTURAL -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 0.004 -0.000 -0.001 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.004) (0.001) (0.002) 
DISTANCE_TO_DISTRICT 0.000* 0.001* 0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) 
URBAN 0.009 0.037 -0.109*** 0.455 -0.013 0.032 
(0.063) (0.122) (0.038) (0.417) (0.087) (0.162) 
LOG_CONSUMPTION -0.098** -0.155* -0.084*** -0.282 0.015 0.101 
(0.045) (0.087) (0.027) (0.296) (0.063) (0.116) 
EDUCATION_HOUSEHOLD_HEAD 0.028 0.055 -0.006 0.034 0.041 0.094* 
(0.021) (0.040) (0.012) (0.138) (0.029) (0.054) 
Constant 1.706*** 1.944* 1.488*** 5.430 -0.031 -1.216 
(0.586) (1.136) (0.352) (3.890) (0.817) (1.512) 
Observations 250 250 250 224 251 251 
R-squared 
Adjusted R-squared 0.371 0.365 0.311 0.168 0.530 0.496 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
We present the main findings in Tables 3-12. Our main reported results are OLS regressions 
of the five categories of dependent variables on the treatment independent variables, along 
with the control variables and fixed effects. Because sub-districts were randomly assigned to 
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the control group and incentivized or non-incentivized treatment groups, this implies 
unbiased estimation of the effect of assignment to a treatment group, or the “intent-to-treat” 
(ITT) effect. Note that for the analyses where treatment effects are disaggregated by the 
program start year, our estimates of program impacts might be biased if areas that started the 
program later differed from the on-time starters in having different socio-economic 
characteristics or administrative capacities. We find few significant differences between the 
on-time and late-starting groups across all of our key control variables, however, so we 
cautiously assume that delays occurred more or less randomly across the sample, though we 
cannot rule out the possibility that unobservable differences may exist between the two 
groups.  For this reason, we focus more on the incentivized versus non-incentivized treatment 
disaggregation and interpret the estimates of treatment effects disaggregated by start year. 
 
For all outcomes with data available from both the baseline survey and the endline survey, we 
take advantage of the longitudinal data using panel regressions.  The endline survey includes a 
more comprehensive set of politically-relevant variables than the baseline; the endline survey’s 
timing shortly after the legislative and Presidential elections in 2009 provides data on the 
major political events, while no analogous data were collected at the baseline period. In the 
case of indicators that were included in the endline survey only, we rely where possible on 
other data sources and include the lag of the dependent variable as a control variable (e.g. 
incumbent vote shares and voter participation in the previous election).   
 
 
6.2. Effects on Support for Incumbents and Political Competition 
 
Tables 3 and 4 show the program’s main effects on the electoral support for the incumbent 
President, members of the legislative assembly from the President’s political party and 
incumbent village heads. Overall, the results provide no conclusive evidence that the program 
benefited incumbent President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) in his July 2009 election, 
though there is strong evidence that the program benefited his party (PD) in the April 2009 
legislative elections.  The results also indicate decreased levels of overall political competition 
in the presidential election.  The evidence suggests that communities generally tend to 
attribute the benefits of PNPM to the central government rather than to village-level 
governments, given the absence of any results demonstrating program effects on increasing 
incumbent village heads’ probabilities of re-election.   
 
Table 3 examines the effect of the randomized “incentivized” and “non-incentivized” 
treatment variants on presidential and national legislative election results.  Each of these 
regression specifications include fixed effects and the core set of control variables that were 
specified in advance of the research, along with an additional variable to control for SBY’s 
vote share in the 2004 presidential election. The share of votes for SBY as a percentage of 
total votes in the presidential election is not significantly higher in treatment districts 
compared to control sub-districts. SBY’s winning margin over the second-best candidate – 
either Megawati or Kalla, depending on the area – also shows no significant difference in 
treatment areas relative to the control group. There is also no evidence of significant effects of 
the program on political competition, although the incentivized treatment increases the 
frequency of political party visits to villages during the relevant legislative/presidential 
campaign season (e.g. for political rallies, to give campaign speeches, etc.), which suggests that 
PNPM heightens the political importance of recipient areas as perceived by political party 
leaders (p<.10).  The results remain very similar if the fixed effects and control variables are 
excluded from the equations and if the incentivized and non-incentivized treatment variables 
are combined into a single treatment category.    
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Table 4.  Effects of CCT on Presidential and National Legislative Election Results 
and Political Competition (by treatment start year) 
 
Presidential Elections National Legislative Elections - DPR 
 
SBY_ 
VOTESHARE 
SBY_ 
MARGIN HHI 
LOG_ 
PARTY
_VISITS 
PD_ 
VOTESHARE 
PD_ 
WINNER 
TREATMENT - start in 
2007 
-0.014 -0.024 -0.007 0.117 0.008 -0.013 
(0.012) (0.024) (0.007) (0.087) (0.017) (0.032) 
TREATMENT - start in 
2008 
0.008 -0.000 0.021** 0.109 0.043* 0.090** 
(0.017) (0.034) (0.010) (0.116) (0.024) (0.044) 
SBY_VOTESHARE_2004 0.431*** 0.883*** 0.182*** -0.699 0.428*** 0.855*** 
 (0.068) (0.132) (0.040) (0.480) (0.094) (0.173) 
PERCENT_MUSLIM -0.002 -0.003 -0.000 -0.011 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.008) (0.002) (0.003) 
PERCENT_ 
AGRICULTURAL 
-0.001 -0.001 -0.000 0.004 -0.000 -0.001 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.004) (0.001) (0.002) 
DISTANCE_TO_DISTRICT 0.000* 0.001* 0.000 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) 
URBAN 0.008 0.036 -0.109*** 0.461 -0.011 0.031 
 (0.063) (0.122) (0.037) (0.418) (0.087) (0.160) 
LOG_CONSUMPTION -0.103** -0.159* -0.091*** -0.328 -0.001 0.050 
 (0.045) (0.087) (0.027) (0.297) (0.062) (0.115) 
EDUCATION_HOUSEHOL
D_HEAD 
0.031 0.060 -0.001 0.026 0.045 0.103* 
(0.021) (0.040) (0.012) (0.139) (0.029) (0.053) 
Constant 1.742*** 1.949* 1.560*** 6.118 0.152 -0.616 
 (0.584) (1.135) (0.346) (3.871) (0.810) (1.493) 
Observations 250 250 250 224 251 251 
R-squared       
Adjusted R-squared 0.372 0.363 0.330 0.166 0.536 0.505 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 4 examines the same set of dependent variables, but disaggregates the treatment variable 
according to the program start year (2007 or 2008) instead of the incentivized or non-
incentivized treatment. These specifications provide evidence that the community development 
program led to significant increases in vote shares for legislative candidates from the President’s 
political party and also reduced overall competition between the presidential candidates, as 
measured by the HHI. The program increased vote shares for legislative candidates from the PD 
party by 4.3% in in sub-districts starting the program in 2008(p<.05), and increased by 9% the 
probability of a PD candidate winning the most votes in the sub-district (p<.10).  The treatment 
starting in 2008 also increased the HHI between presidential candidates by 2.1%, relative to the 
control group (p<.05), indicating decreased competition. It is perhaps surprising that these 
effects occur only in areas where the program started in the year immediately prior to the 
election rather than in areas that had been receiving the program for two years before the 
election, suggesting that the political benefits of the program may be short-lived.  
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Table 5.  Effects of CCT on Village Head Election Results  
(by incentivized / non-incentivized treatment type) 
 
INCUMBENT_ 
VOTESHARE 
INCUMBENT
_MARGIN HHI 
WINNER_ 
VOTESHARE 
WINNER_ 
MARGIN 
CANDID
ATES 
INCENTIVIZED 
TREATMENT 
-0.038 -0.076 0.018 0.016 0.018 -0.029 
(0.041) (0.058) (0.021) (0.019) (0.018) (0.117) 
NON-
INCENTIVIZED 
TREATMENT 
-0.021 -0.078 -0.008 -0.006 -0.004 -0.045 
(0.041) (0.057) (0.021) (0.019) (0.018) (0.119) 
PERCENT_ 
MUSLIM 
0.001* 0.000 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001** -0.005*** 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
PERCENT_ 
AGRICULTURAL 
0.003** 0.005** 0.001*** 0.002*** 0.002*** -0.003 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) 
DISTANCE_TO_ 
DISTRICT 
-0.000 0.000 -0.001*** -0.001** 0.000 0.007*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) 
LOG_ 
CONSUMPTION 
0.099 0.077 0.008 0.007 0.040 0.098 
(0.089) (0.124) (0.031) (0.028) (0.030) (0.180) 
EDUCATION_HH
_HEAD 
0.078* 0.132** 0.011 0.014 0.019 -0.041 
(0.042) (0.060) (0.018) (0.016) (0.017) (0.102) 
Constant -1.197 -1.530 0.233 0.300 -0.532 2.128 
(1.105) (1.534) (0.376) (0.345) (0.369) (2.190) 
Observations 166 159 461 461 442 463 
R-squared 0.075 0.069     
Number of 
kecamatan 
  261 261 260 261 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
While PNPM Generasi had certain effects on national-level political incumbents, the evidence 
indicates no overall effects on incumbent politicians at the village level. The regression models 
in Tables 5 show no significant effects of the program on incumbent village heads’ vote shares 
or winning margins. There are also no significant impacts on political competition as 
measured by the winner’s vote shares, victory margins, or the HHI constructed using village 
head candidate vote share data. Finally, we examine whether the program affects the number 
of candidates who decide to enter the village head electoral race as an alternative basic 
measure of political competition, but again we find no significant effects. In each of these 
regressions, we include the same set of control variables as used in the previous regressions, 
with the exception of the 2004 presidential vote share variable (no analogous incumbent’s vote 
share data exists for previous village head elections).  Table 5 disaggregates the treatment 
variable by the incentivized variant, while Table 6 disaggregates the treatment by start year.  
The results in Table 6 are similar to Table 5 with no coefficients achieving significance at the 
5% level.  To summarize, we find evidence that PNPM Generasi increased vote shares of 
national legislature members from the President’s PD party and reduced political competition 
in the presidential race in areas that received PNPM Generasi in 2008, but we do not find that 
the program significantly affected vote shares for the incumbent President himself or for the 
village head incumbents.    
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Table 6.  Effects of CCT on Village Head Election Results (by treatment start year) 
 
INCUMBENT_ 
VOTESHARE 
INCUMBENT_
MARGIN HHI 
WINNER_ 
VOTESHARE 
WINNER_ 
MARGIN CANDIDATES 
TREATMENT - 
start in 2007 
-0.041 -0.092* 0.007 0.008 0.012 -0.054 
(0.038) (0.052) (0.019) (0.017) (0.017) (0.107) 
TREATMENT - 
start in 2008 
-0.045 -0.133* -0.003 -0.004 -0.004 0.005 
(0.048) (0.067) (0.025) (0.022) (0.022) (0.140) 
PERCENT_ 
MUSLIM 
0.001* 0.001 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** -0.005*** 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
PERCENT_ 
AGRICULTURAL 
0.003** 0.005** 0.001** 0.002*** 0.002*** -0.003 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.003) 
DISTANCE_TO_ 
DISTRICT 
-0.000 0.000 -0.001*** -0.001** 0.000 0.007*** 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) 
LOG_ 
CONSUMPTION 
0.100 0.071 0.008 0.007 0.041 0.095 
(0.089) (0.123) (0.031) (0.028) (0.030) (0.180) 
EDUCATION_ 
HH_HEAD 
0.078* 0.137** 0.011 0.014 0.020 -0.043 
(0.042) (0.060) (0.018) (0.016) (0.017) (0.102) 
Constant -1.197 -1.453 0.236 0.301 -0.541 2.168 
(1.102) (1.520) (0.376) (0.345) (0.369) (2.189) 
Observations 166 159 461 461 442 463 
R-squared 0.079 0.085 
Number of 
kecamatan   
261 261 260 261 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
6.3. Effects on Voter Participation 
 
Table 7-8 show the effects of PNPM Generasi on voter participation in national and local 
elections respectively. We find no significant effects of the program on voter turnout in the 
April and July 2009 elections (for the legislature and the President respectively), nor is there 
evidence that the program affects voter turnout in village head elections. 
 
Table 7 examines the overall voter participation and participation disaggregated by gender in 
the presidential and legislative elections; we find no significant changes in PNPM Generasi 
treatment sub-districts relative to control sub-districts. The set of controls included is the 
same as in the equations in Tables 3, 4, 5, and 6, except that the incumbent’s vote share in the 
2004 presidential election is replaced with voter turnout. We cross-check the findings using 
two different sources of available data: 1) voter turnout data, collected during interviews with 
village heads; and 2) responses from individuals in the household survey, who were asked 
whether they voted in the most recent legislative, presidential, and village head elections. In 
both cases, the findings are similar. The results shown here are for the incentivized and non-
incentivized treatments; the findings are comparable if disaggregated by program start year 
(not shown). 
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Table 7. Effects of CCT on Voter Participation in Presidential and National 
Legislative Elections (by incentivized / non-incentivized treatment type) 
  Presidential Elections 
National Legislative Elections 
(DPR) 
Village head survey data Household survey data 
  Total Men  Women Total  Men Women Total Men Women 
INCENTIVIZED 
TREATMENT 
0.001 0.003 0.000  0.003 -0.009 0.012 0.002 0.003 0.001 
(0.010) (0.006) (0.006)  (0.005) (0.017) (0.017) (0.009) (0.005) (0.006) 
NON-
INCENTIVIZED 
TREATMENT 
-0.006 -0.003 -0.003  -0.004 -0.003 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 0.002 
(0.010) (0.006) (0.006)  (0.005) (0.016) (0.017) (0.009) (0.005) (0.006) 
VOTER_ 
PARTICIPATION_
2004 
0.224*** 0.113*** 0.068*  0.075** -0.102 0.177 0.198*** 0.087** 0.051 
(0.067) (0.039) (0.040)  (0.033) (0.112) (0.114) (0.058) (0.036) (0.038) 
PERCENT_ 
MUSLIM 
-0.001 -0.000 -0.000  -0.000 0.001 -0.001 -0.000 0.000 0.000 
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
PERCENT_ 
AGRICULTURAL 
-0.000 -0.000 -0.000  -0.000 0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
DISTANCE_TO_ 
DISTRICT 
0.000 0.000 -0.000  0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000*** 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
URBAN 0.120** 0.080*** 0.042  0.012 0.036 -0.024 0.089** 0.064** 0.023 
 (0.048) (0.029) (0.029)  (0.023) (0.081) (0.081) (0.042) (0.026) (0.027) 
LOG_ 
CONSUMPTION 
-0.002 -0.025 0.026  -0.016 -0.016 0.001 -0.025 -0.020 0.004 
(0.034) (0.020) (0.020)  (0.017) (0.058) (0.058) (0.030) (0.018) (0.019) 
EDUCATION_ 
HOUSEHOLD_ 
HEAD 
0.000 -0.005 -0.001  0.000 0.001 -0.001 -0.003 -0.006 0.002 
(0.016) (0.009) (0.009)  (0.008) (0.026) (0.027) (0.014) (0.008) (0.009) 
COMMUNITY_ 
GROUPS 
-0.022 -0.013 -0.009  0.011 0.012 -0.000 -0.020 -0.019** -0.013 
(0.016) (0.009) (0.009)  (0.008) (0.026) (0.027) (0.014) (0.008) (0.009) 
COMMUNITY_ 
MEETINGS 
0.000 0.001 0.000  0.000 0.004 -0.004 -0.001 0.002 0.000 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001)  (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) 
Constant 0.699 0.633** 0.023  1.114*** 0.346 0.769 0.960** 0.560** 0.294 
 (0.447) (0.261) (0.264)  (0.219) (0.750) (0.759) (0.389) (0.240) (0.252) 
Observations 251 248 248  251 251 251 251 250 250 
R-squared           
Adjusted R-
squared 
0.375 0.352 0.361  0.062 0.583 0.585 0.470 0.405 0.401 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Similar to the null effects of PNPM Generasi on voter participation in national elections, the 
program does not seem to affect village head election turnout in either the incentivized or 
non-incentivized samples (see Table 8).  The results are similar when the treatment variable is 
disaggregated by program start year.   
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Table 8.  Effects of CCT on Voter Participation in Local Elections 
District Head Elections Village Head Elections 
 
Village head survey Household survey 
Village 
head 
survey 
Household survey 
Total Men Women Total Men Women Total Total Men Women 
INCENTIVIZED 
TREATMENT 
0.002 0.006 -0.001 -0.031 -0.038 0.007 0.002 0.009 -0.022 0.032 
(0.009) (0.006) (0.006) (0.021) (0.031) (0.034) (0.009) (0.016) (0.033) (0.036) 
NON-
INCENTIVIZED 
TREATMENT 
-0.005 -0.006 -0.004 -0.011 0.028 -0.039 -0.014 -0.008 -0.018 0.010 
(0.009) (0.006) (0.006) (0.020) (0.030) (0.033) (0.009) (0.016) (0.033) (0.035) 
PERCENT_ 
MUSLIM 
-0.001 -0.000 -0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.000 -0.001* 0.000 0.004** -0.004* 
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) 
PERCENT_ 
AGRICULTURAL 
0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.002* 0.001 -0.003 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
DISTANCE_TO_ 
DISTRICT 
-0.000 0.000 -0.000* -0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.000* -0.000 0.000 -0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) 
URBAN 0.049 0.002 -0.003 -0.239** -0.023 -0.216  0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.045) (0.030) (0.028) (0.101) (0.150) (0.164)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
LOG_ 
CONSUMPTION 
0.022 -0.001 0.024 0.075 -0.110 0.184 0.005 0.066* -0.050 0.116 
(0.032) (0.022) (0.020) (0.071) (0.105) (0.115) (0.018) (0.037) (0.078) (0.084) 
EDUCATION_ 
HOUSEHOLD_ 
HEAD 
0.018 0.005 0.010 -0.018 -0.026 0.008 0.019** 0.010 -0.024 0.034 
(0.015) (0.010) (0.009) (0.033) (0.049) (0.054) (0.010) (0.017) (0.036) (0.039) 
COMMUNITY_ 
GROUPS 
-0.009 0.013 -0.009 0.023 0.017 0.006 -0.005 0.020 0.060 -0.040 
(0.015) (0.010) (0.009) (0.034) (0.050) (0.055) (0.008) (0.019) (0.040) (0.042) 
COMMUNITY_ 
MEETINGS 
0.000 -0.000 0.002 -0.002 0.004 -0.006 -0.001 -0.000 -0.003 0.003 
(0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004) (0.006) (0.007) (0.001) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) 
Constant 0.388 0.359 0.057 0.146 1.495 -1.349 0.463** 0.057 0.593 -0.536 
 (0.415) (0.280) (0.257) (0.934) (1.389) (1.520) (0.222) (0.477) (1.009) (1.081) 
Observations 263 253 253 235 235 235 461 216 216 216 
R-squared 0.563 0.511 0.533 0.347 0.438 0.408  0.167 0.412 0.379 
Number of 
kecamatan 
      261    
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
6.4. Effects on Political Access/Activity and Local Government 
Capacity 
 
This section tests whether the PNPM Generasi program improves communities’ access to local 
politicians and the political activeness of community members. We examine the frequency of 
visits to communities by political party representatives during the campaign season, meetings 
between village leaders and higher-level government officials, and protests from community 
members to village-level and district-level governments.   
 
Several robust findings in Table 9 indicate that PNPM Generasi generally increases local 
communities’ access to higher-level political officials. First, we observe some evidence that the 
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program increases the level of contact between village-level officials and higher-ranked 
officials at the level of the DPR (National Legislative Assembly). The positive coefficients of 
.045 and .062 on the “Invited” and “Was_Visited” variables, respectively (p<.10 and p<.05) 
suggest that the non-incentivized PNPM Generasi sub-district government officials are both 
more likely to invite and to be visited by DPR officials. Village heads were also asked to report 
the frequency of visits of other tiers of government officials, including the district-level 
assemblies members, provincial-level assemblies (DPR-D) members and the district heads 
(bupati), but there were no significant changes in these variables across treatment and control 
groups. Together with the previous findings, these results support the fact that PNPM Generasi 
seems to have been politically relevant particularly for candidates in the national legislative 
assembly. 
 
Table 9.  Effects of CCT on Political Access and Political Activity 
DPR member District head (bupati) 
 
Invited Was_ Invited 
Visite
d 
Was_
Visited Invited 
Was_
Invited Visited 
Was_ 
Visited Protests 
INCENTIVIZED 
TREATMENT 
-0.010 -0.016 0.001 0.011 0.016 0.006 0.003 -0.009 0.110 
(0.024) (0.012) (0.018) (0.029) (0.046) (0.037) (0.054) (0.050) (0.101) 
NON-
INCENTIVIZED 
TREATMENT 
0.045* -0.004 0.011 0.062** 0.051 -0.005 0.005 0.055 0.268*** 
(0.023) (0.012) (0.017) (0.028) (0.045) (0.037) (0.053) (0.049)  
PERCENT_ 
MUSLIM 
0.000 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001 0.000 -0.001 0.000 0.002 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.007) 
PERCENT_ 
AGRICULTURAL 
0.001 0.001** 0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.000 -0.002 -0.008 
(0.001) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.005) 
DISTANCE_TO_ 
DISTRICT 
-0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.003 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
URBAN 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.048 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.483) 
LOG_ 
CONSUMPTION 
-0.060 0.010 -0.038 0.048 0.132 0.079 0.247** -0.087 0.795** 
(0.056) (0.028) (0.041) (0.066) (0.106) (0.087) (0.125) (0.116) (0.342) 
EDUCATION_ 
HOUSEHOLD_ 
HEAD 
0.036 0.014 0.004 0.028 -0.091* -0.010 -0.123** -0.043 -0.227 
(0.026) (0.013) (0.019) (0.031) (0.049) (0.040) (0.058) (0.054) (0.160) 
COMMUNITY_ 
GROUPS 
0.029 -0.004 0.001 0.004 0.050 0.022 0.097 0.174*** 0.121 
(0.027) (0.014) (0.020) (0.032) (0.051) (0.042) (0.060) (0.056) (0.156) 
COMMUNITY_ 
MEETINGS 
-0.002 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.006 0.003 -0.015** -0.010 -0.004 
(0.003) (0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.007) (0.005) (0.008) (0.007) (0.020) 
Constant 0.591 -0.299 0.296 -0.541 -1.215 -0.727 -2.169 1.532 -8.716* 
 (0.717) (0.365) (0.528) (0.854) (1.366) (1.115) (1.610) (1.498) (4.451) 
Observations 237 237 237 237 237 237 237 237 264 
R-squared 0.146 0.145 0.180 0.164 0.201 0.180 0.263 0.282 0.182 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
We additionally find that the incidence of protests from community members to the district-
level government increases significantly by 26.8% in the non-incentivized treatment group 
relative to the control group.  The authors assume this indicates that the treatment heightens 
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awareness of the channels through which to express political demands among the community 
members, although an increase in protests could potentially indicate increased public 
dissatisfaction with the political incumbents in PNPM Generasi areas.  We find the latter 
explanation less compelling, however, given the previous evidence on the program’s role in 
increasing political activities in communities as well as evidence presented in the following 
section that the program increases satisfaction with district-level governments. Indeed, the 
observed increase in political activity and higher demands of voters in treatment areas fits well 
with the earlier finding that PNPM Generasi increases the political importance of these areas. 
 
Table 10.  Effects of CCT on Local Government Capacity 
  
Village Gvt. 
Participation 
Existence of 
BPD 
Number of BPD 
Meetings 
INCENTIVIZED TREATMENT 0.012 0.010** 0.084 
(0.010) (0.005) (0.231) 
NON-INCENTIVIZED TREATMENT 0.008 0.004 0.013 
(0.010) (0.005) (0.230) 
PERCENT_MUSLIM 0.001** -0.000 0.003 
(0.001) (0.000) (0.012) 
PERCENT_AGRICULTURAL 0.000 0.000 0.001 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.008) 
DISTANCE_TO_DISTRICT -0.000 0.000 -0.002 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.004) 
LOG_CONSUMPTION 0.020 -0.004 1.556*** 
(0.022) (0.010) (0.480) 
EDUCATION_HOUSEHOLD_HEAD 0.014 0.001 -0.433* 
(0.012) (0.005) (0.256) 
COMMUNITY_GROUPS 0.055*** -0.001 -0.028 
(0.010) (0.004) (0.212) 
COMMUNITY_MEETINGS -0.002 -0.001 0.032 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.028) 
Constant -0.380 1.071*** -15.434** 
(0.273) (0.121) (6.063) 
Observations 463 463 463 
Number of kecamatan 261 261 261 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Finally, we find that PNPM Generasi does not seem to affect the functioning of the village 
governance board (BPD) institutions (see Table 10). Aside from a small and marginally 
significant increased probability that the BPD exists in incentivized treatment areas (p<.10), 
there is no discernable increase in the percentage of areas reporting that a functional BPD 
exists nor any increased frequency in BPD meetings reported to have occurred in the three-
month period prior to the endline survey.  Further, there is no significant increase in 
participation in village government as reported by household respondents. In summary, we 
find in this section that PNPM Generasi increases both the political activity among the 
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communities and the frequency of contact between communities and higher-level officials, as 
measured by meetings/invitations between villages and national assembly members as well as 
by the number political protests to district-level governments. At the same time, the program 
has no discernable impact on the local government capacity. 
 
 
6.5. Effects on Satisfaction with Public Services 
 
To measure changes in satisfaction with government as a result of the PNPM Generasi 
program, surveyed households were asked to report whether they have noticed any change in 
the quality of government administrative services during the past two years. Table 11 shows 
that while households in PNPM Generasi areas do not report any improvement or changes in 
the satisfaction with village-level government services, those in the incentivized treatment 
group report improvements in district-level government administrative services relative to the 
control group (p<.05) with a magnitude over 10%. Similarly, the coefficient on satisfaction 
with district-level administrative services in the incentivized treatment group is significant 
(p<.05), with a magnitude of 8%.  This evidence suggests that the district-level governments 
may receive some credit for PNPM Generasi program, while village governments are not 
similarly rewarded. 
 
Table 11.  Effects of CCT on Satisfaction with Local Government Administrative 
Services (by incentivized treatment type) 
District-level government Village-level government 
 
Perception of 
Improvement Satisfaction 
Perception of 
Improvement Satisfaction 
INCENTIVIZED 
TREATMENT 
0.103** 0.100** 0.080** 0.085** 0.036 0.015 0.009 0.003 
(0.045) (0.043) (0.036) (0.035) (0.033) (0.028) (0.024) (0.021) 
NON-
INCENTIVIZED 
TREATMENT 
0.028 0.020 0.003 0.007 0.002 -0.009 -0.037 -0.036* 
(0.046) (0.042) (0.036) (0.035) (0.034) (0.028) (0.024) (0.021) 
PERCENT_ 
MUSLIM 
-0.000 0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.001 -0.004** -0.001*** -0.004** 
(0.001) (0.003) (0.000) (0.003) (0.000) (0.002) (0.000) (0.002) 
PERCENT_ 
AGRICULTURAL 
0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 -0.002 -0.000 -0.002** -0.002 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
DISTANCE_TO_ 
DISTRICT 
0.002** 0.001 0.001** 0.001 0.001** 0.000 0.001*** 0.000 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.000) 
URBAN 0.014 0.208 -0.090 0.005 -0.132 0.165 -0.176* 0.034 
 (0.188) (0.206) (0.149) (0.168) (0.139) (0.135) (0.099) (0.102) 
LOG_ 
CONSUMPTION 
-0.180 -0.095 0.058 0.004 0.021 0.019 0.110* -0.012 
(0.121) (0.146) (0.096) (0.119) (0.089) (0.095) (0.063) (0.073) 
EDUCATION_ 
HOUSEHOLD_ 
HEAD 
0.101* 0.026 0.015 -0.016 0.030 -0.040 -0.016 -0.033 
(0.057) (0.068) (0.045) (0.055) (0.042) (0.044) (0.030) (0.034) 
Constant 3.400** 2.550 0.622 1.438 1.415 2.047 0.384 2.288** 
 (1.518) (1.901) (1.209) (1.549) (1.126) (1.244) (0.798) (0.945) 
Observations 264 264 264 264 264 264 264 264 
R-squared 0.072 0.278 0.087 0.256 0.056 0.428 0.117 0.386 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
The SMERU Research Institute 
 
32
6.6. Effects on Entry into the Village Head Office 
 
Finally, we test the effects of the PNPM Generasi program on increasing opportunities for 
individuals from different groups to enter local politics as candidates and/or winners in village 
head elections (see Table 12). We focus on the entry of candidates who have traditionally been 
very poorly represented in village politics, including women and members of smaller/poorer 
sub-villages. We also explore whether the program affects the age or education level of village 
heads who are elected to office. 
 
Table 12.  Effects of CCT on Entry of Under-Represented Groups to  
Village Head Position 
 
Women Age Education Level Neighborhood Characteristics 
 
Number of 
Candidates 
Percent 
Votes Under 40 Under 50 
High 
School College 
Socio-
Economi
c Rank 
Population 
INCENTIVIZED 
TREATMENT 
0.016 0.004 -0.150*** -0.049 -0.094** 0.002 -0.005 0.028 
(0.017) (0.009) (0.049) (0.047) (0.045) (0.043) (0.021) (0.033) 
NON-
INCENTIVIZED 
TREATMENT 
-0.004 -0.001 -0.130*** -0.042 -0.041 -0.010 -0.011 0.041 
(0.017) (0.009) (0.048) (0.046) (0.044) (0.042) (0.021) (0.033) 
PERCENT_ 
MUSLIM 
0.000 0.000 -0.002 -0.000 -0.001 0.005* -0.000 0.004** 
(0.001) (0.000) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
PERCENT_ 
AGRICULTURAL 
-0.000 -0.000 -0.003 -0.000 -0.000 0.000 -0.001 -0.001 
(0.001) (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
DISTANCE_TO_ 
DISTRICT 
0.000 -0.000 0.001 0.001 0.001 0.000 0.001*** 0.000 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
LOG_ 
CONSUMPTION 
-0.022 0.003 -0.183 -0.098 -0.184* -0.026 -0.020 0.081 
(0.035) (0.018) (0.114) (0.108) (0.103) (0.098) (0.042) (0.066) 
EDUCATION_ 
HOUSEHOLD_ 
HEAD 
0.044** 0.021** -0.154*** -0.088* 0.025 -0.002 0.012 -0.070* 
(0.019) (0.010) (0.053) (0.050) (0.048) (0.046) (0.023) (0.036) 
Constant 0.175 -0.081 3.340** 2.197 3.183** -0.020 0.968* -0.967 
 (0.444) (0.234) (1.482) (1.401) (1.340) (1.273) (0.540) (0.842) 
Observations 463 461 237 237 237 237 463 461 
R-squared   0.282 0.203 0.294 0.188   
Number of 
kecamatan 
261 261     261 261 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The findings are once again somewhat mixed: PNPM Generasi does not seem to affect the 
number of female candidates running for the village head office nor the vote shares garnered 
by female candidates in either the incentivized or non-incentivized treatments. Counter to our 
initial hypothesis that the program might facilitate the election of younger village heads, it 
seems that the program in fact encourages the election of older leaders, given the highly 
significant decreases of 15% and 13% in the number of village heads under the age of 40 in 
the incentivized and non-incentivized treatments respectively.13  One potential explanation of 
                                                 
13The coefficients are in the same direction if this definition is adjusted to village heads under the age of 50 
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this fact might be that the village head positions become more sought-after once villages 
receive PNPM funds (e.g. since presumably the village head has some influence over these 
funds), and thus older (and presumably wealthier) candidates are more motivated to enter/win 
these races.  Finally, no significant effects of the program are detected on the election of 
candidates from poorer or smaller sub-villages as village heads, and PNPM Generasi is not 
associated with any consistent overall change in the education levels of elected village heads. 
Overall, PNPM Generasi does not strongly impact the characteristics of village heads who 
were elected after the start of the program, except for decreasing the number of younger 
village heads. 
 
 
 
VII. DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
 
 
Overall, we find that PNPM Generasi’s strongest political effects include rewarding DPR 
candidates affiliated with the President’s PD party, decreasing competition in the Presidential 
election, and increasing the satisfaction with district-level government services. While it may 
not seem surprising that a social transfer program is politically popular, the results are 
noteworthy in several respects. First, it is interesting to note that the program did not 
significantly increase the support for the incumbent President himself; instead, legislative 
candidates from the PD party benefited from the program by receiving higher vote shares in 
the PNPM Generasi areas. This result warrants further research, including a qualitative 
exploration of whom the respondents credit for the program. It is possible that PNPM 
Generasi beneficiaries tend to attribute the program to their legislative representatives rather 
than to the President; voters might make this assumption, for example, if they are aware that 
the program benefitted their own region and was not implemented everywhere across the 
nation. An alternative explanation, however, might be simply that voter preferences for 
Presidential candidates tend to be stronger than their preferences for legislative candidates, 
and so the latter may be easier to influence and more responsive to the receipt of PNPM 
Generasi’s program benefits. 
 
The overall results are particularly surprising because unlike traditional clientelistic programs, 
PNPM Generasi did not allow for benefits to be easily politically manipulated, and mechanisms 
against such risks were explicitly built into the program design; funds were to be distributed 
according to an ongoing regular schedule, contingent on meeting the health and education 
benchmarks. Moreover, program benefits could not easily be withdrawn in case the recipients 
did not vote for incumbent politicians. The re-election of legislators in the PD party or 
President SBY was unlikely to directly affect the likelihood that communities already receiving 
the PNPM program would continue receiving it. Indeed, all the communities participating in 
PNPM Generasi before the election continued to receive the program regardless of their 
behavior during the 2009 elections.  However, program participants may not have been fully 
aware that PNPM was not associated with a particular political party, and since the program 
was new and had yet to withstand a change in political incumbents, it may have been rational 
for voters to expect the likelihood of the program continuing to be higher if the PD party 
remained in power. 
 
These findings can plausibly be interpreted as evidence of retrospective voting, where 
politicians are rewarded for implementing good policies, rather than as evidence of vote-
                                                 
though they are no longer significant at the 5% level. 
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buying. Although the program was not officially attributed to a political party, and we have 
not found any evidence that politicians explicitly tried to manipulate voters by claiming that it 
was, households may still have assumed the opposite, or they may have used their votes to 
express reciprocity toward incumbents. One public statement by a member of the government 
of West Papua, Abraham Atururi, during the distribution of funds in the province, reflects 
what may have been a common sentiment among the public that voting for PD would make 
receipt of PNPM more likely in the future: “This fund will continue to be offered to us [West 
Papuans] if the President is reelected. That's why I pray he will be our President again.”14   
 
In terms of the policy implications, the finding that the CCT model analysed here can 
potentially offer political rewards to incumbents generally seems to bode well for the future 
political sustainability of such programs. Regardless of the anti-poverty benefits associated 
with such a program, it could be difficult to gain long-term political support for a program 
that is not politically popular. While CCTs tend to limit politicians’ ability to target the 
program toward particular groups (e.g. core supporters, swing voters, etc.) as compared with 
traditional clientistic programs, they may offer the potential benefit of greater legitimacy in the 
selection process where technical poverty criteria are used to determine beneficiaries. Our 
finding that the political benefits of the program may be most pronounced during its first year 
may raise the possibility that it might be wise, at least from a purely political standpoint, for 
governments to repackage such programs every few years, for example, under new names, or 
with slightly different variations in program rules to keep in check the risk of program 
discontinuation due to changes in political administration. The experience of Mexico’s Progresa 
program, initiated under Ernesto Zedillo’s PRI administration and revamped under the new 
name of Oportunidades soon after Vincente Fox of the PAN party took power, provides one 
such example where repackaging of the old program when the new administration took power 
was a useful political strategy that safeguarded its continuation.  At the same time, it is 
important for such programs to ensure that the targeting process used to determine 
beneficiaries is free from political influences.   
 
As expected, given that the central government was the architect of the PNPM Generasi 
program, the electoral benefits of the program are attributed mainly to politicians involved in 
national-level politics, including legislative assembly candidates from the President’s party. We 
also detect positive effects on perceptions of district-level government administrative service 
provision, which indicates that credit for the program may be somewhat disbursed between 
different levels of government.  It could be argued that district-level governments deserve a 
share of the political rewards associated with the program, given that its successful functioning 
depends on the local officials’ compliance with the program rules delineated by the central 
government. The same argument could be applied to village leaders; we do not detect, 
however, any effects of the program on satisfaction with village-level government. 
 
Finally, from a policy perspective, the null results of the program on voter participation rates are 
perhaps somewhat surprising. While they do not negate the possibility that PNPM Generasi may 
have increased the levels of community participation and empowerment, they also suggest that any 
such effects do not extend to the sphere of formal politics. Of course, one potential explanation 
may be that the time frame of the study (approximately two years) is insufficient to expect that 
meaningful changes in political participation would take effect. Additionally, Indonesia’s already 
high historical baseline rates of voter participation (over 50% in the 2004 Presidential election, for 
example) may make it particularly difficult to further increase these rates. 
 
                                                 
14“SBY, Kalla compete to lure voters.” The Jakarta Post, Jan. 24, 2009. 
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VIII. CONCLUSION 
 
 
There is surprisingly little persuasive empirical evidence on how voters reward incumbent 
governments when desirable policies are implemented. The present research is one of only a 
small handful of studies that estimate the magnitude of the impact of a social transfer program 
on voting behavior with a credible exogenous source of variation in the independent variable. 
It is also the first study the authors are aware of that estimates the political effects of a CCT 
program whose benefits are distributed at the community level rather than to individual 
households. We are unable to distinguish whether the results are observed due to the specific 
community-based aspect of the program or due to other features common to all CCT 
programs; this remains a question for future research. 
 
Our research opens up several avenues for future academic and policy studies. First, there is 
the question of the extent to which our findings can be generalised. Our research on PNPM 
Generasi is limited to rural areas, where most of Indonesia’s population live, but we cannot 
assume that the same effects would be found in urban areas, where voters tend to be better 
informed and may generally exhibit different types of political behavior. The extent to which 
our findings are applicable to other countries is also uncertain, though we have no particular 
reason to expect that our findings should not be applicable, at least to some degree, to other 
developing democracies; although Indonesia is overwhelmingly Muslim, research indicates 
that its voters pay little heed to religious affiliations and inducements, and instead adhere 
primarily to the same party and leadership cues as voters in other emerging democracies 
(Liddle and Mujani 2007). Our findings on electoral rewards to incumbents are similar to 
those of De La O (2010), though in contrast to her results, we do not find positive effects of 
the program on voter participation.  
 
Another area for further research would be to explore the political effects of the CCT 
programs using a longer time horizon than the two-year period of this study. In particular, it 
would be useful to test whether any effect of CCTs on voter participation could be detected 
over a longer term. 
 
Finally, future research could explore whether CCTs political effects differ depending on a 
variety of household-level or region-level characteristics, such as poverty levels, previous 
political affiliations, ethnic or religious factors, etc. Insight into this would be useful in 
identifying potential causal mechanisms behind the results observed in this study. It would 
also be interesting to test whether the political impact of CCTs depends on the programs’ 
achievement of the stated goals of improvement in health and education. If possible, future 
research could also link data on the distribution of program benefits with voting data at the 
individual or household level. Such comparison would allow researchers to trace more directly 
the source of any political effects of the program, including whether any changes in the 
support for the incumbent or voter participation can be associated specifically with program 
recipients or non-recipients. 
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